The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page

Pure Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Deterministic Games

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives that she achieves.)Comment: 72 page

The Complexity of Quantitative Information Flow in Recursive Programs

Information-theoretic measures based upon mutual information can be employed to quantify the information that an execution of a program reveals about its secret inputs. The information leakage bounding problem asks whether the information leaked by a program does not exceed a given threshold. We consider this problem for two scenarios: a) the outputs of the program are revealed, and b)the timing (measured in the number of execution steps) of the program is revealed. For both scenarios, we establish complexity results in the context of deterministic boolean programs, both for programs with and without recursion. In particular, we prove that for recursive programs the information leakage bounding problem is no harder than checking reachability

Percentile Queries in Multi-Dimensional Markov Decision Processes

Markov decision processes (MDPs) with multi-dimensional weights are useful to analyze systems with multiple objectives that may be conflicting and require the analysis of trade-offs. We study the complexity of percentile queries in such MDPs and give algorithms to synthesize strategies that enforce such constraints. Given a multi-dimensional weighted MDP and a quantitative payoff function $f$, thresholds $v_i$ (one per dimension), and probability thresholds $\alpha_i$, we show how to compute a single strategy to enforce that for all dimensions $i$, the probability of outcomes $\rho$ satisfying $f_i(\rho) \geq v_i$ is at least $\alpha_i$. We consider classical quantitative payoffs from the literature (sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, truncated sum, discounted sum). Our work extends to the quantitative case the multi-objective model checking problem studied by Etessami et al. in unweighted MDPs.Comment: Extended version of CAV 2015 pape

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a Nash equilibrium of G where Player 0 wins with probability 1? Moreover, this problem remains undecidable when restricted to pure strategies or (pure) strategies with finite memory. One way to obtain a decidable variant of the problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability 1 can be done in polynomial time for games where the objective of each player is given by a parity condition with a bounded number of priorities

Training infection control and hospital hygiene professionals in Europe, 2010 : agreed core competencies among 33 European countries

The harmonisation of training programmes for infection control and hospital hygiene (IC/HH) professionals in Europe is a requirement of the Council recommendation on patient safety. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control commissioned the ‘Training Infection Control in Europe’ project to develop a consensus on core competencies for IC/HH professionals in the European Union (EU). Core competencies were drafted on the basis of the Improving Patient Safety in Europe (IPSE) project’s core curriculum (CC), evaluated by questionnaire and approved by National Representatives (NRs) for IC/HH training. NRs also re-assessed the status of IC/HH training in European countries in 2010 in comparison with the situation before the IPSE CC in 2006. The IPSE CC had been used to develop or update 28 of 51 IC/HH courses. Only 10 of 33 countries offered training and qualification for IC/ HH doctors and nurses. The proposed core competencies are structured in four areas and 16 professional tasks at junior and senior level. They form a reference for standardisation of IC/HH professional competencies and support recognition of training initiatives.peer-reviewe

Operative Traffic Management for Energy-Efficient Train Operation

We present a system that performs a network-wide optimization of rail traffic with respect to energy consumption by informing trains of upcoming conflicts. Our system works in cooperation with a driver assistance system installed on board of trains but is not tied to a vendor-specific solution since it uses a vendor-independent protocol to communicate with the trains. In a simulated scenario, we were able to demonstrate a reduction in energy consumption by 45% as opposed to when our system was not in use